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Summary: Weak institutional constraints generate corrupting behavior and lack of accountability 
that is the main source of socially harmful political choices. The lack of a unitary legal framework 
that would offer clear rules of procedure for the application to and execution of resources 
designated to capital investments by the local governments, facilitates decisions that are not always 
taken in the public interest. As our empirical examination demonstrates, political affiliation matters 
in Executive and Parliamentary choices regarding capital investment allocations to local 
governments. Political actors are, in effect, picking up the projects that affect people’s lives not on 
the basis of their social value, the winners are instead determined according to their political 
connections.  
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1. RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
Clientelism occurs when political parties use public resources, and particularly government programs 
and offices, as a means of rewarding political supporters and extract rents for themselves and their 
entourage. Politicians provide not programmatic public policies, but individual benefits, like resource 
allocations for their supporters and other favors that use public resources. The existence of such 
relationships is harmful for the development of any society; the deviation of public investments from 
their most welfare-enhancing usages is economically damaging. Moreover, private investments 
directed at capturing political rents create additional social welfare losses because of the divergence 
effect from more productive activities (from a social point of view).     
In this context, the questions we ask are the following: Does clientelist politics exist in the Republic 
of Moldova? If so, how widespread is it and how does it affect political decisions? And finally, what 
are the conditions that facilitate or restrain the emergence and persistence in time of this type of 
behavior?  
In order to investigate the existence and extent of clientelist politics that has economic 
ramifications, we need to emphasize the features of political behavior favoring some groups at the 
expense of the public interest. Political and economic institutions are, in effect, strongly 
interconnected and major changes in the set of political incentives can have widespread effects on 
economic opportunities, and vice versa. We now have many societies in which only a small fraction 
of the population are given the opportunity to get into the (economic) action. The Republic of 
Moldova, as many other countries with weak institutional infrastructure, is one of those countries 
where many economic opportunities are reserved for specific groups. Because economic incentives 
and opportunities do not exist in a vacuum, but are shaped by the political, social and legal 
constraints, the study of political decision making is of paramount importance in elucidating the 
causes that undermine economic and social progress. 
Political decisions that favor some groups, thereby undermining total social welfare, give rise to 
extractive institutions. These extractive institutions can take the form of weak constraints on 
authorities in charge of allocating public resources – such as resource allocations for capital 
investments to local governments. Such arrangements are likely to be used as “carrots” by the 
established political elite to influence political preferences at local level governments and can 
furthermore serve as devices that political incumbents can use in order to commit to their promises 
of rent dissipation in exchange of specific groups’ support.      
A deeper comprehension of the issue of political commitment can thus help in understanding why 
high shares of public resources may be allocated to satisfying some individuals’ private interests 
rather than to the maximization of the social welfare. Politicians, in weak democracies, face a 
commitment problem because they would like to offer specific policies to interest groups (private 
firms, local – political – organizations, local authorities, etc.) in exchange of their political support. 
Since law cannot be used to enforce this type of exchanges, some mechanisms that could enforce 
politicians’ promises ex post are necessary. Rent creation, market power, privileges, and differences 
between economic agents are those mechanisms that offer incentives to local political organizations 
and private agents to support a given political elite. For a politician to ensure the support of those 
that can secure him additional votes, he must be able to use policies that tie their continuation 
utility to his political success. Favoritism in intergovernmental allocation mechanisms satisfies 
these conditions.   
This theory suggests that economic and political systems are organically related and that political 
competition also entails systematic economic competition and long term economic development, 
whereas systems that limit access to politics exhibit clientelist economic interactions. This 
hypotheses has been empirically tested and confirmed within different contexts/countries (Hanes, 
2007 found that under Socialist government in Sweden municipalities with a high share of Socialist 
voters were more likely to apply for grants and to receive them1). Our purpose here is to emphasize 
the limited access political and economic order in the Republic of Moldova. And also, to test this 
hypothesis, offering an objective measure of clientelism – what has never been done before. The 
analytical framework set above will help in better identify the areas susceptible to clientelism and it 
offers valuable insights into how we can switch to a superior social equilibrium.  
First, we will assess the allocation procedures of public resources from the Government to each of 
the first level local governments. The existence of clear and stable rules with regard to the transfer 
amounts from the state budget designated to resource allocations of capital investments to local 
governments would moreover temperate the members of Parliament when they examine the 
proposal issued by the Ministry of Finance together with the Government within the framework of 
the annual state budget law. It is worth noting here that there is no such regulation in the Republic 
of Moldova. This institutional weakness, as it shall become clear in the next sections, significantly 
contributes to the existing bias in the allocation of scarce public resources to local authorities. This 
hypothesis is corroborated by our results obtained from the econometric test. The case of 
independent candidates also presents interesting insights. Public resources are, in effect, used as 
“carrots” to ensure independent candidates’ loyalty toward the political majority.   
Understanding the sources and manifestations of intergovernmental and economic clientelism is 
critically important to our understanding of the transition from limited access political and economic 
order to open political and economic competition (as we noted earlier, both are organically related). 
No wonder, then, that the approach and subjects we propose to investigate are important for both, 
policy makers and the international donor community together with our European partners.   
2. BIAS IN RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS FROM CENTRAL TO LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS:  THE CASE OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS  
Capital investments represent the resources invested in the acquisition or building of new assets; or 
major repair in and replacement of existing assets that have an economic life longer than one year 
and a value above a specified threshold2. In the Republic of Moldova, capital investments have also 
the highest share in total capital expenditures. In the 2012 state budget law published in the Official 
Monitor on January 25th, 2012, the amount allocated for capital investments to local governments 
represented MDL 30 million – that is almost 30% from total local authorities’ expenditures for the 
same period – remaining approximately at the 2011 level. The amounts allocated for the purpose of 
capital investments at the first level of local governments vary, however, in time, quite significantly. 
For instance, the annual budget law for 2010 allocated slightly more than MDL 70 million to local 
governments for capital investments; in 2009, the resources allocated to local capital investments 
were even greater, amounting to MDL 190 million with an execution rate of 97.7% due to the 
economic slowdown. All the relevant information regarding the projects that have been approved to 
receive the demanded resources, the list of local governments that are the beneficiaries from the 
respective projects and the amounts allocated per project are presented in the annexes to each 
annual state budget law3.  
                                                          
1 See also, Veiga, L.G. and M.M. Pinho (2007), The political economy of intergovernmental 
grants: Evidence from a maturing democracy, Public Choice, V.133.  
2 This is the definition used in the World Bank reports. See World Bank’s Guidebook on Capital 
Investment Planning for Local Governments, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTURBANDEVELOPMENT/Resources/336387-
1319755058239/Chapter1.pdf  
3 See Ministry of Finance’s website, 
http://www.minfin.md/ro/actnorm/budget/law/lowbudget1/  
Although financial management rules vary greatly from country to country, there are few core 
principles outlined in World Bank’s guidebook to capital investments for local governments: 
 The allocation of public resources to capital investments must fulfill the principle of public 
interest. That is, a local government takes care of assets only if they are needed to provide local 
public goods to constituencies or to perform other mandatory obligations of the local 
authorities; 
 Since the (public) resources are scarce, their allocation need to be rigorously evaluated in lights 
of the competing needs of various local authorities, so that to maximize the value of the 
financial resources in the areas of highest priority;  
 Local financial policies need to be formulated and capital investment priorities clearly set; 
 Alternatives should be carefully assessed and considered within the framework of life cycle 
costing; 
 The process and results need to be transparent to the decision makers and the public.  
Following these core principles of governance for the allocation of capital investments, the goal is to 
impact (eventually in a positive way) people’s lives. The key implications are: 
 On the overall quality of life through the provision of the most essential public goods and related 
services. Given that public resources are scarce, it is important to make the right choices among 
competing investments; 
 On the economic progress of given localities. Locating capital investments wisely can affect the 
attractiveness of some regions for private sector investments.  
In this context, it is important to examine whether capital investment allocations follow the 
aforementioned principles that favor public interest or if, alternatively, there are some mechanisms 
that deviate resources to the satisfaction of some other interests – namely politicians’. To do so we, 
first, need to diagnose the existing (in)efficient arrangements.  
2.1. The existing institutional framework 
The Directorate for National Economy’s Finances and Capital Investments (hereafter, the 
Directorate) is the administrative structure within the Ministry of Finance that is responsible for the 
realization of investment policies in Moldova. The Directorate determines the (social) necessity and 
economic efficiency of budgetary allocations for investment purposes and examines the materials 
presented by the eventual beneficiary party (or parties) regarding the net social value of the project 
and the way resources allocated to the project’s implementation will be used. It is also responsible 
for monitoring the way projects are implemented.   
There are two main factors restraining the behavior of local public officials who apply for capital 
investment allocations:  
 On the one hand, the Ministry of Finance has elaborated a methodological note that contains a 
specific procedure to be respected when applying for budgetary resources. In writing down the 
project that is to benefit from public capital investments, the potential beneficiary must strictly 
obey by the rules of procedure stated in the Ministry of Finance’s methodological note. Here we 
should note that the procedure elaborated by the Ministry of Finance does not specify clear 
criteria for the assessment of alternative projects. Moreover, it does not make explicit the 
difference between goods and services the provision of which is required by law and public 
supply that is actually at local government’s discretion – the latter is more specifically dependent 
on constituents’ preferences and welfare. These loopholes are likely to undermine the efficiency 
and fairness in the provision of local public goods;  
 On the other hand, there is a set of legal provisions that apply when planning and managing the 
execution of public capital investments by local governments, such as: the Law on construction 
quality (72-XIII from February, 2, 1996); the Law on budgetary process (847-XIII from May, 24, 
1996); and the Law on public procurement (96-XVI from April, 13, 2007). Respect for the legal 
procedures mentioned above is binding upon all public actors financed partially or entirely from 
budgetary resources. However, it is worth noting that Moldova’s national Court of Accounts has 
issued few reports pointing out to the existing (numerous) deviations from the de jure 
constraints, and in particular the chaotic organization of the allocation and monitoring 
processes4.  
There is therefore no unitary legal framework that would offer clear rules of procedures for the 
application to and execution of resources designated to capital investments by the local 
governments. More important, this legal loophole generates uncertainty and perverse motivations 
for those in charge of deciding who is going to get the scarce public resources and which projects are 
not eligible for receiving budgetary support. The Ministry of Finance together with the Directorate 
for National Economy’s Finances and Capital Investments have the discretionary power to accept or 
refuse a proposal, to augment or reduce the amount demanded for the realization of the respective 
project. For instance, at the stage of deciding which projects will be included on the list that will 
eventually be annexed to the annual state budget law, the Ministry of Finance and the Directorate 
collaborators follow a code that is not legally binding and which consists in ensuring a certain 
equilibrium between the ongoing long term projects and the incoming ones to be financed. It is not 
a formal rule, but since there are no clear constraints on decision makers’ choices, it is up to them to 
define this trade-off. It is worth noting that in 2012 the costs of all projects eligible for public capital 
investments represented MDL 0.5 billion whereas the available funds were approximately MDL 117 
million. Because resources are highly scarce, in 2011 only a very limited number of new projects 
were accepted for financing from budgetary resources.     
Moreover, when the list of projects to be financed is further transmitted to the Government and 
then to the Parliament, the lack of clear legal basis regulating approval of capital investment projects 
creates greater incentives for the members of Parliament to deviate from that list by adding new 
beneficiaries and remove some others. The latter can, in effect, uphold the list of projects and the 
amounts stipulated on the Ministry of Finance and Government’s proposal or they can considerably 
modify the list of beneficiaries as well as the amounts allocated per project. There is indeed a non 
negligible difference between the draft law with the annexes containing resources for capital 
investments elaborated by the Ministry of Finance and the final list of projects approved by the 
Parliament when examining the budget for the next year. Negotiations take place, indeed, between 
the members of Parliament that result in new projects being included on the list of those that are 
going to be financed and the suppression of some other projects that are considered of minor 
importance or rather investment projects that are not so visible for their respective electorates. The 
members of Parliament can thus make amendments to the draft elaborated by the Ministry of 
Finance and propose these changes to the Legislative Commission for the Economy, Budget and 
Finances. The latter can approve or alternatively disapprove the proposed amendments. Obviously, 
the Commission is more likely to uphold projects proposed by members of the ruling elite.  
There is no objective criterion that members of the Parliament follow in deciding whether a project 
from a local public authority is going to obtain the demanded funds or not. The lack of such criteria 
at this stage but also when the draft law is prepared by the Ministry of Finance clearly violates the 
aforementioned principles of good governance layed down in World Bank’s guidebook to capital 
investment for local governments. However, we should mention that our representatives cannot 
greatly change the total amount allocated for the purpose of public capital investments without 
pointing to credible sources of financing the additional expenses.     
                                                          
4 http://www.ccrm.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=2&id=4755&t=/Presa/Noutati/Utilizarea-
mijloacelor-publice-pentru-investitii-si-reparatii-capitale-la-Ministerul-Finantelor  
In the next section we empirically investigate and prove the existence of politically motivated 
resource allocations to local governments – namely that local governments’ political affiliation 
significantly affects the share of resources for capital investments that one will obtain, as opposed to 
the public interest theory. Our findings, thus, do not support the romantic vision of public decision-
making which says that political decisions are taken solely in the public’s interest. The results 
presented below put the emphasis on the necessity for credible and hence functioning constraints 
on public decision makers in order to reduce their discretionary power over public resources.   
2.2. Empirical evidence of politically motivated resource allocations to local governments 
We empirically test the hypothesis about the existence of political bias affecting the resource 
allocation for capital investments to local governments (via transfers from the state budget). We use 
a database with the transfer amounts from the state budget designed for capital investments for 
each first level local government, as well as the political affiliation of each mayor. Hence, the political 
bias hypothesis will be confirmed if the localities governed by mayors affiliated to a ruling political 
party or coalition benefit, on average, of more transfers as opposed to the other parties. The 
analyzed period is 2009-2012 which allows testing for political bias before and after the political shift 
from the mid-2009. Additionally, we compare the estimates for the transfers proposed by the 
Government with the finally approved ones by the Parliament. Hence, in case the political bias 
hypothesis is confirmed, we may check whether it is determined mainly by the executive or 
legislative powers.  
 
In order to test whether the allocations for capital investments are statistically influenced by the 
political affiliation of mayors, we will use an ANOVA econometric model. We control for the 
dimension of each locality, since it can also explain the amount of transfers allocated from the state 
budget. Hence, in order to avoid the endogeneity bias, our dependent variable will be the ratio 
between the transfers for capital investments and own revenues accumulated by each local 
government. The explanatory variables will be binary dummies which describe the political affiliation 
of each mayor. Thus, for each year from 2009 to 2012 we will perform two regressions (the first one 
with the transfers approved by the Government and the second one is with the final amounts voted 
by the Parliament), each containing 5 binary variables. In order to avoid the dummy variable trap, 
we excluded the constant. The model specification is as follows: 
                                     
Where: 
    = the ratio between the amount of transfers for capital investment and own revenues of each 
locality i 
    = 1 if the mayor of ith locality is a member of PCRM;    = 0 if otherwise. 
     = 1 if the mayor of ith locality is a member of AMN;    = 0 if otherwise. For the year 2012:     
= 1 if the mayor of ith locality is a member of PLDM;   = 0 if otherwise.  
    = 1 if the mayor of ith locality is a member of PD;    = 0 if otherwise. 
    = 1 if the mayor of ith locality is a member of PL;    = 0 if otherwise. 
    = 1 if the mayor of ith locality is a member of other parties or is a politically non-affiliated 
candidate;    = 0 if otherwise. 
 
The political bias hypothesis affecting the allocation of resources for capital investments in local 
governments will be confirmed if some of the estimated parameters of ANOVA regression (      ) 
will have a positive sign and be statistically different from zero.  
 
The estimation results (see Table 1) confirm the fact that the political affiliation of mayors is relevant 
for explaining the decision of the Government and the Parliament regarding the allocation of 
resources to local governments. For example, in 2009, when PCRM has been the ruling party, the 
estimated coefficient of the dummy variable D1 is statistically significant and has the highest value. It 
means that the ratio between transfers allocated to the localities with a mayor affiliated to this party 
and locality’s own revenues were, on average, higher by MDL 0.8312 million in comparison with 
other parties. The political bias characterized the allocation pattern for the 2010, 2011 and 2012 
years as well, while the beneficiaries were the localities led by mayors affiliated to the parties 
forming the current ruling coalition: PD, AMN (till 2012) and PLDM (since 2012), PL being an 
exception. For example, according to the state budget law for 2012, the localities with mayors 
affiliated to PLDM and PD have, on average, by MDL 1.49 million and, respectively, by MDL 1.3 
million more transfers for capital investments than other parties.  
 
Additionally, it is worth point out the fact that the political bias is much stronger for the transfers 
initially approved by the Government: the coefficients standing for each binary variable are much 
higher in comparison to the regressions with the transfers approved by the Parliament. It means that 
political affiliation has a higher importance in the decision making of the executive branch which 
could be the result of lobby and negotiations between the mayors and the Government. 
 
Table 1. Estimation results of ANOVA econometric model 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 Parliame
nt 
Governmen
t 
Parliamen
t 
Governmen
t 
Parliamen
t 
Governmen
t 
Parliamen
t 
PCRM 0.8312* 
(0.4540) 
0.5514*** 
(0.1627) 
0.2306**
* 
(0.0800) 
0.3315*** 
(0.1268) 
0.0777* 
(0.0431) 
0.2709 
(0.1841) 
0.2922 
(0.3355) 
AMN 1.0726* 
(0.6472) 
0.6024** 
(0.2334) 
0.2367** 
(0.1147) 
0.6298*** 
(0.1818) 
0.2623**
* 
(0.0619) 
- - 
PD 0.0497 
(0.9631) 
0.0674 
(0.3525) 
0.3355* 
(0.1732) 
0.0954 
(0.2746) 
0.1359 
(0.0935) 
0.4799*** 
(0.1767) 
1.2953**
* 
(0.3215) 
PL 0.4776 
(1.4711) 
0.0867 
(0.8239) 
0.1563 
(0.4049) 
0.00 
(0.6418) 
0.0534 
(0.2185) 
0.2774 
(0.2665) 
0.1254 
(0.1542) 
Other  0.2626**
* 
(0.4773) 
0.6096*** 
(0.1673) 
0.2373**
* 
(0.0822) 
0.0085*** 
(0.1303) 
0.0077** 
(0.0443) 
0.4846* 
(0.2785) 
0.3824* 
(0.2051) 
PLDM - - - - - 0.3366** 
(0.1538) 
1.4893**
* 
(0.2814) 
Source: Author’s calculations 
3. PUBLIC RESOURCES FOR CAPITAL  INVESTMENT USED AS „CARROTS”  
3.1. Is the Executive picking-up the „winners”?  
The interesting and probably counterintuitive result that we obtained from our estimations is that 
there is a greater influence from the Government on the allocation decisions than the alterations 
that take place at the stage of Parliamentary negotiations. Executive’s interference in the allocation 
and execution of resources designated to local governments’ capital investments is greatly 
facilitated by the lack of any regulatory framework that would set general rules of procedure and 
thereby restrain decision makers’ discretionary power. In effect, despite numerous initiatives for 
building a stable, clear (containing general rules) and credible (enforceable) framework governing 
the choice and execution of capital investments for local governments – for most of them advocated 
by Moldova’s international partners – there is no real progress to report on this key issue. Only in 
2012 a team of national and international experts has sought to elaborate such a regulatory 
framework. However, there is no official information regarding the term when it will be approved by 
the Government, voted by the members of Parliament as an organic law and de facto implemented.  
As our results clearly indicate, the Executive strongly favors local governments that have political 
connections/belong to the ruling parties’ political family (AEI – the alliance for European 
integration). First, one can clearly see that local governments affiliated to the ruling majority (i.e. to 
the AEI) are way more likely to obtain budgetary resources for capital investment. Figure 1 presents 
the likelihood a local mayor has to obtain budgetary resources for capital investments given his 
political connections: 42.2% of the mayors politically affiliated with the current elite were granted 
allocations by the Ministry of Finance and the Government within the framework of the draft state 
budget law, while only 3% of the mayors from the communist party have been included on the list of 
beneficiaries.  
Figure 1. The probability5 of capital investment allocations to first level local governments, 
depending on their political affiliation, 2012, % 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data provided by the Ministry of Finance 
Although we see in the Figure 1 a strong effect of the political affiliation on allocation outcomes, the 
clientelist hypothesis is only partially confirmed. In effect, localities with AEI affiliated mayors may 
have had coincidentally higher investment needs that would render higher social benefits or some 
other factors might have influenced the allocations. This is why we used the ANOVA model and have 
obtained the results depicted above. These results confirm the existence of a significant effect from 
mayors’ political affiliation on the likelihood of them receiving budgetary resources for capital 
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investment even when controlling for such criteria as the amounts allocated and the size of local 
governments.   
3.2. The (not so) puzzling case of the independent candidates 
We also observe that independent candidates are clearly in a better position than, as for instance in 
2012, the main party from the opposition – the Communist Party. In effect, independent mayors 
were twice as likely as were the communists to obtain budgetary resources for capital investments 
at the first level local governments. This effect holds even when controlling for local governments’ 
internal revenues that serve as a good proxy for each locality’s size and when taking into account the 
relative importance of the amounts received. There is a rational explanation for this phenomenon. 
Besides offering benefits to their party-fellows, the ruling elite is also strongly interested in 
influencing regions where neither they nor their main opponent has succeeded. Regions where the 
electorate is highly likely to switch to the opposition or alternatively to the incumbents, need to be 
offered “carrots” so that to alter electorate’s and independent candidates’ preferences by directing 
them toward the ruling class in the next election cycle. One would rationally expect candidates 
publicly affiliated to the ruling elite to receive the highest share of resources from the central 
government (even when controlling for their number, the amounts received and the economic 
importance of their respective localities). But one would also expect independent candidates to 
receive more than the opposition. Independent candidates are thus only formally independent. That 
is, after elections, they depend upon and support the ruling party or coalition of parties. This 
hypothesis is thus corroborated by our empirical findings.  
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS AN D RECOMMENDATIONS  
Political clientelism undermines the economic development of the Republic of Moldova by deviating 
public resources from their most efficient usages. It is, therefore, of outmost importance to 
understand how and why clientelist arrangements emerge and persist over time. It is only through a 
diagnosis of the conditions under which politicians engage in the dissipation of public resources for 
satisfying private interests that one can devise credible and efficient constraints that restrain 
politicians’ discretionary power. Weak institutional constraints generate corrupting behavior and 
lack of accountability that is the main source of socially harmful political choices. The lack of a 
unitary legal framework that would offer clear rules of procedure for the application to and 
execution of resources designated to capital investments by the local governments facilitates 
decisions that are not always taken in the public interest. As our empirical examination 
demonstrates, the political bias is stronger for the transfers initially approved by the Government. 
The Executive is, in effect, picking up the projects that affect people’s lives not on the basis of their 
social value. Instead the winners are determined according to their political affiliation.  
The political affiliation also matters when the state budget law is examined within the Parliament. 
The members of Parliament do not always transpose into law people’s preferences. They usually 
propose amendments so that localities that are politically-friendly to the incumbents get more of 
public resources and the opposition less. In between, there are the so called independent candidates 
that get less than mayors that belong to the ruling party or parties, but still more than the 
opposition. This observation suggests independent candidates’ only partial independence. They 
exchange their support for the incumbents for a higher share of public resources allocated to their 
respective localities. All in all, these results suggest us a less romantic account of public decision 
making and that self-interest also applies to political actors.  
The table below summarizes World Bank’s recommendations regarding the organization of resource 
allocations to LGs as opposed to the current practices in Moldova which generate conflicts of 
interest and social costs: 
Table 2. World Bank’s guiding rules for capital investment allocations to LGs vs. the current 
situation in the Republic of Moldova 
World Bank recommendations regarding capital 
investment allocations to LGs 
vs. Current practices in the Republic of Moldova 
The allocation must fulfil the principle of public 
interest. 
 
The Ministry of Finance selects the objects to be 
financed and the respective beneficiaries 
according to projects’ congruence with 
Government’s investment priorities. However, 
these terms can be widely interpreted and do 
not offer a clear basis for public decision 
making.    
Allocations need to be rigorously evaluated in 
lights of the competing needs of various LGs. 
 
Such an evaluation would require an objective 
assessment of the social costs and benefits 
generated by the competing projects. There is 
no legal basis for such a regulatory framework 
in Moldova.  
Capital investment priorities need to be clearly 
set, at the local level. 
 
The methodological note from the Ministry of 
Finance states that LGs need to set their 
investment priorities for the current year as well 
as for the next two years. Investment priorities 
also risk to be affected by a clear legal basis 
regulating the selection of objects and 
beneficiaries. Hence, the actual procedure may 
incentivize LGs to advance projects that are 
more politically visible rather than satisfying the 
public interest criterion. 
 
In order to eliminate the current arrangements that are self-enforcing due to the benefits that 
extract central and local authorities from clientelist exchanges, one needs to devise formal and 
credible constraints on public decision makers. The latter will, furthermore, restrain their behavior 
only under an increased political competition. We address the following recommendations that, we 
hope, can accelerate the passage from the limited access society to an open one based on 
accountability and impersonal arrangements: 
 The Ministry of Finance needs to elaborate a unitary legal framework which would offer clear 
rules of procedure for the application, allocation and execution of resources designated to 
capital investments for the local governments. The objective is to have projects selected on the 
basis of objective criteria the commitment to which can ensure efficient and fair social 
outcomes. A draft law is currently examined by Ministry of Finance’s collaborators. However, the 
civil society does not have access to its content and there is no information regarding the 
timeline of its approbation by the Government and adoption by the Parliament; 
 Within the new legal framework that should regulate the selection, allocation and management 
of capital investments to local governments, public authorities should rely more on costs-
benefits analysis to choose among competing investment needs. That is, objective criteria based 
on economic and social justice implications of the relevant alternatives. In effect, within a local 
government but also at the stage of intergovernmental allocations, projects need to be weighted 
by their relative social impact – the goal is to minimize costs or maximize social benefits, the two 
represent indeed the same thing; 
 These two formal or external constraints – procedural rules and costs/benefits analysis – cannot 
restrain decision makers’ behavior unless accompanied by an increased and effective political 
competition. Political competition yields, in effect, benefits to citizens just as competition in 
markets yields benefits for consumers. Competition increases accountability for incumbents. 
Moreover, under constant pressure and uncertainty with regard to the outcome of the next 
elections, politicians are highly incentivized to devise constraints on the next period ruling party 
so that to reduce the latter’s discretionary power.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
